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Abstract
We provide a framework for determining the centralities of agents in a broad family of
random networks. Current understanding of network centrality is largely restricted to deter-
ministic settings, but practitioners frequently use random network models to accommodate
data limitations or prove asymptotic results. Our main theorems show that on large random
networks, centrality measures are close to their expected values with high probability. We
illustrate the economic consequences of these results by presenting three applications: (1)
In network formation models based on community structure (called stochastic block mod-
els), we show network segregation and differences in community size produce inequality.
Benefits from peer effects tend to accrue disproportionately to bigger and better-connected
communities. (2) When link probabilities depend on spatial structure, we can compute and
compare the centralities of agents in different locations. (3) In models where connections
depend on several independent characteristics, we give a formula that determines central-
ities ‘characteristic-by-characteristic’. The basic techniques from these applications, which
use the main theorems to reduce questions about random networks to deterministic calcula-
tions, extend to many network games.
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1 Introduction
In many settings of economic interest, agents benefit from connections to others. These peer
effects depend on network structures, and better positioned agents can benefit much more
than their less central counterparts. In education, for example, students form networks of
friends and these connections affect academic achievement through group study, as a source
of motivation, etc. Empirical evidence suggests that the impact of these peer effects on
outcomes is approximated well by measures of network centrality such as Katz-Bonacich
centrality (Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), Hahn, Islam, Patacchini, and
Zenou (2015)). More generally, measures of centrality and related quantities are crucial to
understanding economic models from peer effects and quadratic games on networks to social
learning models such as DeGroot updating.1
While there is a large literature on Katz-Bonacich and other centrality measures in deter-
ministic settings, relatively little is known about centrality measures on stochastic networks.
But in many applied settings, precise data about the full network is not available. Researchers
instead use statistical models of network formation where links form with probabilities de-
pending on agent characteristics. As a very simple example, one could model the social
network in a school with black and white students by assuming two students of the same
race are friends with probability 50% while two students of different races are friends with
probability 25% (where all connections form independently). Moreover in theoretical work,
varying parameters in models of random network formation often provides more insight than
comparing particular deterministic networks.
The current paper gives a framework for determining how central each agent in a large
random network will be. With this framework, we can reduce questions about values and
comparative statics of centrality measures to the better understood deterministic setting. For
applied work, these formulas also provide justification for approximating agents’ centralities
based only on information about frequencies of various types of links in the absence of more
1For peer effects and network games beyond education, see among others Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and
Zenou (2006), Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’amours (2014) and Ko¨nig, Liu, and Zenou (2018). For the role
of eigenvector centrality in DeGroot learning, see DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) and Golub and
Jackson (2010).
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detailed network data.
The two main theorems characterize the centralities of agents in a large family of ran-
dom network formation models including stochastic block models, which are a basic and
widely-used class of models allowing group structure. We focus on two common measures
of centrality, eigenvector and Katz-Bonacich centrality, which measure how many neighbors
an agent has with more central neighbors weighted more heavily. In the spirit of the law
of large numbers, the theorems show that asymptotically with high probability all agents’
centralities are close to values which we can compute from link formation probabilities. The
proofs of these theorems rely on random graph theory, and in particular utilize a recent
result by Chung and Radcliffe (2011).
We need several conditions to ensure centrality measures converge, and a key requirement
is that the network is not too sparse. Whether a link between two particular agents forms
is random, but if these agents have enough connections then this link realization only has
a small effect on their network position. In addition to the main theorems, we discuss how
centrality measures need not converge when the network is too sparse or unbalanced and
give several examples.
Our main application of these theorems relates homophily (the tendency for links to form
within communities more than between communities) and inequality of outcomes. Returning
to the example of education, within-school homophily is an important factor in understand-
ing how social interactions matter for educational outcomes (Echenique, Fryer, and Kaufman
(2006)). Most student populations at schools in the United States include groups of stu-
dents of multiple races, and social connections tend to be denser within these groups than
between groups. We examine the consequences of this segregation for overall distributions
of performance and describe mechanisms by which network structures create or exacerbate
inequality.
In more detail, we ask how distributions of centrality change as we vary link probabilities
to increase or decrease homophily. This approach assumes that outcomes depend linearly
on centrality, which is the case in standard models such as Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini, and
Zenou (2009) but need not hold in arbitrary non-linear models. To take these comparative
statics we consider stochastic block models of network formation: agents are divided into
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several groups and the probability two agents are connected depends on whether they are
in the same group. We compare distributions using a strong notion of relative inequality
of outcomes, Lorenz dominance. By this measure, more segregated networks are indeed
more unequal. So in our example of a school with black and white students, educational
achievement would be more equal if the probability two students of the same race are friends
decreased to 45% or the chance of a friendship between races increased to 30%. In the
context of Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), the implication is that policy
changes decreasing segregation within schools would decrease not only the racial achievement
gap but also the overall achievement gap. We can also ask which groups benefit most in
absolute terms from new links. Similar dynamics tends to persist, but we find a notable
exception. When indirect connections are sufficiently valuable, adding connections between
different groups actually benefits a well-connected majority group more than a disadvantaged
minority.
We also discuss how our theorems could be applied to more general network formation
models. An alternative to group structure is spatial structure, with agents situated in a
continuous space and closer agents connecting with higher probabilities. Determining which
locations are most advantageous is subtle: we give a numerical example where certain agents
are relatively central when connections are very concentrated locally or there are many
connections at long distances, but not for intermediate networks. Without our asymptotic
results, this type of comparison would only be tractable via simulations. We also give a
formula for centralities in a network depending on several independent characteristics, such
as race or gender and geography. Computing the centrality of an agent reduces to taking the
product of her centralities in separate networks each depending on only one characteristic.
While we focus on centrality, the methods introduced have broader implications for net-
work models with linear structure, from quadratic games to learning processes. Modifications
of our theorems apply to a number of other economically relevant quantities related to eigen-
vectors or powers of a network’s adjacency matrix. One example is influence in the DeGroot
learning model, which is the eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of a stochastic matrix derived from
the adjacency matrix (Golub and Jackson (2010)). Thus, we can relate influence to social
groups or geographic locations. Another example is the social segregation index of Echenique
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and Fryer (2007), so our methods also describe how individuals’ segregation indices depend
on group structure.
The results in this paper give a framework to analyzing distributions of centrality in two
parts. First, our main theorems reduce characterizing these distributions asymptotically to
a deterministic calculation involving the matrix of link probabilities. Second, the latter half
of the paper carries out this in deterministic calculation in several applications. Jointly,
these analyses let us relate centralities to parameters in random network models capturing
segregation and geography.
In more detail, the structure is as follows: the remainder of this section discusses related
literature. In Section 2, we introduce notation and describe our family of network formation
models. Section 3 defines and discusses eigenvector centrality and Katz-Bonacich centrality.
The two main theorems about centrality measures are given in Section 4. Section 5 examines
the impact of homophily on inequality in networks using stochastic block models. Other
network formation models are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes, and proofs and
further extensions appear in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
A large literature studies how network structure matters for quadratic network games, and we
provide techniques to extend these analyses to random networks. As observed by Ballester,
Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) as well as many subsequent papers, Katz-Bonacich cen-
tralities are equal or closely related to Nash equilibrium strategies in games with appropriate
quadratic utility functions. These models are supported by a number of empirical papers
identifying agent decisions and/or outcomes in areas such as education (Calvo´-Armengol,
Patacchini, and Zenou (2009)) and R&D (Ko¨nig, Liu, and Zenou (2018)) with Katz-Bonacich
centrality. While certain properties of networks can be understood in a deterministic anal-
ysis, important features of network structure are best captured by random networks. In
particular, Theorems 1 and 2 facilitate comparative statics on equilibria with respect to
segregation, geographic clustering and network density.
Beyond the application to quadratic games, the current paper contributes to several
active areas of research in network economics: literatures on centrality measures, inequality
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in networks and homophily.
There are long-lived literatures in sociology and more recently economics and engineering
aiming to quantify how central individuals are in a network (e.g. Katz (1953) and Bonacich
(1987)). By exploring the mean field theory and comparative statics of eigenvector and Katz-
Bonacich centrality, we add to a theoretical literature on centrality measures. One existing
approach is to understand centrality measures in terms of their formal properties, as in the
axiomatic characterizations by Dequiedt and Zenou (2017) and Bloch, Jackson, and Tebaldi
(2017). Rather than axiomatizing centrality measures, we describe how to calculate these
measures and give comparative statics.
Most closely related to the current paper, simultaneous works by Avella-Medina, Parise,
Schaub, and Segarra (2017) and Parise and Ozdaglar (2018) study asymptotic convergence of
centrality measures and equilibria of network games as part of an analysis of graphons. Their
focus is on characterizing centrality measures for graphons, which are a generalization of
networks to settings with a continuum of agents that includes our large-population model as
a special case. We focus on exploring the economic consequences of asymptotic convergence
in large finite networks. In particular, by assuming that links grow at a faster rate, we obtain
a sharper bound on the distance between vectors of centralities. This allows characterizing
centralities of individual agents and thus taking comparative statics as in Section 5.2
The applications in Section 5 connect to network economics literatures on inequality
and homophily. There has been growing interest in how network structure affects inequal-
ity, though this research is diverse in topics and models. Kets, Iyengar, Sethi, and Bowles
(2011) consider allocations which are stable with respect to deviations by highly connected
subgroups, and show that denser networks lead to more equitable distributions. Their analy-
sis uses the Lorenz dominance relation to compare allocations, and we use the same relation
in Section 5.1. Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2007)
study inequality in the context of job search using a model where employment information
2Our large enough eigenvalues condition will be more restrictive than the model in Avella-Medina, Parise,
Schaub, and Segarra (2017), which requires that the maximum expected degree is at least O(log n). This
lets us bound the Euclidean distance between eigenvectors centralities by a constant and Katz-Bonacich
centralities by a term of order
√
n, while Theorem 2 of Avella-Medina, Parise, Schaub, and Segarra (2017)
includes an additional factor of
√
log n.
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spreads through networks stochastically. Several papers on strategic network formation con-
sider settings where central agents obtain disproportionate rents from their network position
(Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) and Hojman and Szeidl (2008)). We contribute to this var-
ied literature by looking at a setting where network structure influences outcomes because
of strategic complementarities and by examining how homophily matters for inequality.
Like centrality, homophily in networks has been an active research area in sociology, eco-
nomics and computer science for decades (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)
for a survey). The methods in the current work are closest to those in Golub and Jackson
(2012)’s work on homophily and the speed of learning. Like Golub and Jackson we consider
stochastic block models, and we also use techniques from random matrix theory to reduce
questions about the spectra of random networks to questions about a fixed deterministic
network.3 Stochastic block models are also used in much of the community detection liter-
ature, which studies algorithms for finding subgroups in homophilous networks (e.g. Karrer
and Newman (2011)).
2 Model
In this section, we specify notation for networks and define a stochastic model of network
formation.
2.1 Notation
A network is a set of nodes N = {1, ..., n} and a set of edges contained in N×N . All networks
will be undirected, so that (i, j) is an edge whenever (j, i) is an edge. The neighbors Ni of
node i are the set of nodes connected to node i by an edge.
A network is determined by its adjacency matrix A, which is defined by Aij = 1 if there
is an edge between agents i and j and Aij = 0 otherwise.
A walk on a network is a finite sequence of vertices such that each pair of consecutive
vertices in the sequence are connected by an edge. A walk containing k + 1 vertices has
3The relevant spectral quantity is the second eigenvalue in Golub and Jackson (2012) and the first
eigenvector here.
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length k.
Given a vector x ∈ Rn, the Euclidean norm is denoted by ‖x‖2. Given an n× n matrix
A, the matrix 2-norm ‖A‖2 is defined by sup‖x‖2=1 ‖Ax‖2. When A is a symmetric matrix,
‖A‖2 is equal to the maximum absolute value of an eigenvalue of A.
2.2 Random Networks
We define random networks by generating links independently with link probabilities speci-
fied by a matrix A¯. Each edge between agents i and j is formed with probability A¯ij. These
links are generated independently, so that the entries of the adjacency matrix of the network
are independent random variables.4
Given an n×n matrix of link probabilities A¯, we generate one instance of a network with
n agents and let A be the adjacency matrix of this network.
Stochastic block models are our leading example. Consider a set of n nodes divided into m
groups. In a stochastic block model, the probability of an edge between two agents depends
only on their groups, so that A¯kl = pij whenever agent k is in group i and agent l is in group
j. Because the amount of homophily in the network depends on parameters determining the
sizes of groups and probabilities of links between groups, we can vary homophily in different
ways by changing these parameters.
Note that both A¯ and A are symmetric matrices. As a consequence, these matrices have
n eigenvalues (counted with multiplicity), and these eigenvalues are real. Let λ1, λ2, ..., λn
be the eigenvalues of A¯, ordered so that
|λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥ ... ≥ |λn|.
Similarly, let λ1, λ2, ..., λn be the eigenvalues of A, ordered so that
|λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥ ... ≥ |λn|.
We assume that all link formation probabilities are positive, so that A¯ is a positive matrix
and satisfies the conclusions of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. In particular this matrix has
4This assumption is relaxed in Appendix B.2.
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a unique eigenvector with largest eigenvalue, λ1, and this eigenvector has non-negative real
entries.
Finally, we consider sequences of random networks indexed by the population size n.
Definition 1. A sequence of random networks is, for each n in a sequence of positive
integers converging to infinity, an n×n matrix of probabilities A¯(n) and an adjacency matrix
A(n) of a network generated with these probabilities.
3 Centrality Measures
We consider two common measures of centrality, which we refer to as Katz-Bonacich central-
ity and eigenvector centrality. These notions of centralities are defined by linear equations,
and this linearity makes analyzing these centrality measures on random networks tractable.
In subsequent sections, we discuss how the distributions of centralities of agents in random
networks depend on parameters in the network formation model.
3.1 Katz-Bonacich Centrality
We first discuss the Katz-Bonacich centralities of agents in a network. This measure can be
interpreted in terms of both linear algebra and graph theory.
Fix a positive constant φ < ‖A‖−12 . Recall ‖A‖2 is equal to the maximum of the norm
‖Ax‖2 for a unit vector x, so that the condition implies ‖φAx‖2 is not too large relative to
‖x‖2.
Definition 2. The Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i with respect to the constant φ is
given by ci(A, φ), where c(A, φ) is the solution to
c(A, φ) = φAc(A, φ) + 1,
where 1 is the column vector with all entries 1.
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This equation is solved uniquely by
c(A, φ) = (I − φA)−11
=
∞∑
k=0
φkAk1.
Because (Ak)ij is the number of walks from agent i to agent j, this series has a com-
binatorial interpretation. The Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i is the number of walks
beginning at agent i, with each walk discounted according to its length with discount fac-
tor φ. So larger values of φ correspond to counting longer connections more heavily, while
smaller values of φ correspond to counting shorter walks more.
A growing literature relates Katz-Bonacich centrality to strategies and outcomes in games
on networks. Suppose that agents choose a level of effort which determines outcomes, and
that the utility of the agent when effort levels are e is
ui(e) = ei − 1
2
e2i + φ
n∑
j=1
Aijeiej.
This functional form implies that utility is quadratic in effort levels and that there are
complementarities between an agent’s effort and her neighbors’ effort. Then at a Nash
equilibrium the strategies e∗ satisfy
e∗ = φAe∗ + 1.
So the equilibrium strategies are given by Katz-Bonacich centralities:
e∗ = c(A, φ).
Therefore, in these games, effort is equal to Katz-Bonacich centrality and utility is a quadratic
function of Katz-Bonacich centrality. If we assume that effort determines outcomes and that
peer effects manifest through the costs to effort, then an agent’s outcome is just her Katz-
Bonacich centrality.
3.2 Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality is a closely related notion. The eigenvector centrality of agent i is the
ith coordinate of the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix with eigenvalue of largest absolute
value. More formally:
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Definition 3. The eigenvector centrality of agent i in the network with adjacency matrix
A is given by vi(A), where v(A) is the eigenvector of A with largest eigenvalue, i.e. the
solution to
Av(A) = λ1v(A)
which satisfies ‖v(A)‖2 = 1.
Remark 1. If the first eigenvalue has multiplicity greater than one, the eigenvector centrality
may not be uniquely defined.5 Our results will not depend on the choice of convention in
these cases.
Remark 2. Because we must choose a normalization, the ratios between the eigenvector
centralities of different agents are more meaningful than the levels of each agent’s centrality.
An agent’s eigenvector centrality is proportional to the sum of her neighbors’ eigenvector
centralities:
vi(A) = λ
−1 ∑
j∈Ni
vj(A).
In other words, eigenvector centrality is a measure of how many neighbors an agent has,
with more central neighbors counting more.
Eigenvector centrality can be thought of as a limit of Katz-Bonacich centralities. More
precisely, the Katz-Bonacich centrality c(A, φ) approaches the line spanned by the eigenvec-
tor centrality v(A) in the limit as φ approaches ‖A‖−12 from below.
To clarify the intuition behind results in later sections, we describe a stylized dynamic
model relating eigenvector centrality to peer effects. Suppose that each individual begins
with an endowment wi(0) in period 0. In each period t + 1, each individual’s endowment
changes to cwi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni wi(t) for any c > 0. This says that an agent’s resources are a
linear combination of her resources from the previous period and the sum of her neighbors’
resources from the previous period. In matrix notation,
w(t+ 1) = (cI + A)w(t).
5We assumed in Section 2 that A¯ is positive, which implies by the Perron-Frobenius theorem that v(A¯)
is unique. But even when A¯ is positive, there is a positive probability that the realized matrix A is not
positive, so we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalue λ1.
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Then as t → ∞, the endowments w(t) become proportional to v(A). The limit as endow-
ments are repeatedly updated is the eigenvector centrality. This model closely resembles the
mechanical process in Section V.A of Echenique and Fryer (2007).
4 Centrality on Random Networks
This section characterizes the centralities of agents in networks generated using stochastic
block models. With high probability, the vector of centralities will be close to a deterministic
vector depending on the link probabilities. In Sections 5 and 6, we compute this determin-
istic vector for particular random network models. Combining those computations with the
theorems in this section will clarify the impact of link probabilities, and thus features of
network structure such as the amount of homophily, on the distributions of centralities of
agents.
Before stating these theorems, we will state and discuss two technical conditions.
Definition 4. We say that a sequence of random networks has non-vanishing spectral
gap if there exists δ > 0 such that
λ1(n)− |λ2(n)| > δλ1(n)
for all n.
This says that the absolute value of the ratio between the second eigenvalue and the first
is bounded away from one. Golub and Jackson (2012) call the second eigenvalue spectral
homophily and show that this quantity measures the amount of homophily in a network.6 As
a simple example of the connection, consider a stochastic block model in which all groups have
the same size, the probability of a given link within groups is equal to ps and the probability
of a link between groups is pd. In this setting the ratio between the second eigenvalue and
the first eigenvalue is equal to the usual Coleman homophily index (see Section II.C of Golub
and Jackson (2012)).
So the spectral gap is non-vanishing when there is not extreme homophily. Intuitively, the
condition is satisfied if for large n the network cannot be split into two subgroups which are
6Golub and Jackson (2012) consider matrices with first eigenvalue equal to one.
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nearly disconnected. If all nodes have the same degree in A¯(n), we can make this claim more
formal. Suppose the ratio between the second eigenvalue and the first eigenvalue converges
to one. Then the uncoupling theorem from Hartfiel and Meyer (1998) implies that there
exist subsets M(n) ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of agents such that∑
i∈M(n),j /∈M(n) A¯(n)ij∑
j A¯(n)ij
→ 0
as n → ∞. In words, the total weight on links between M(n) and its complement grows
much more slowly than the degree of a single agent.
A non-vanishing spectral gap ensures that the eigenvector centralities of A¯ and A are
uniquely defined with high probability. In cases of extreme homophily, there can be multiple
eigenvectors of A¯ or A with the largest eigenvalue corresponding to different disconnected
groups or collections of groups. With non-vanishing spectral gap, we avoid this situation
with high probability.
To state the second condition, we define ∆ = maxi
∑n
j=1 A¯(n)ij to be the maximum
expected degree of a node.
Definition 5. We say that a sequence of random networks has large enough eigenvalues
if
λ1(n)√
∆ log(n)
→∞
as n→∞.
The intuitive content of this technical condition is that (1) the expected degrees of agents
grow sufficiently faster than log n, and (2) expected degrees do not vary too much across
agents. To better understand this intuition, we use the following fact (Lev (2014)):
λ1(n)
2 ≥ (min
i,j
A¯(n)ij)
∑
i
∑
j
A¯(n)ij. (1)
If each agent i’s link probabilities do not vary too much across neighbors j, condition (1) im-
plies that nmini,j A¯(n)ij grows faster than log n.
7 If condition (2) holds, then
∑
i
∑
j A¯(n)ij
is not too large relative to ∆n. Combining these two informal bounds then gives that
7More generally, a sequence can have large eigenvalues even if some links have probability zero or very
small probability. In these cases equation (1) will not give a useful lower bound on the eigenvalues.
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λ1(n)
2 > ∆ log(n). We will see how a sequence of random networks can fail to have large
enough eigenvalues if one agent has a much higher expected degree than others in Example 2.
The condition rules out very sparse networks. If most or all agents have very few links,
centralities will be very sensitive to whether particular links form. So characterizing cen-
tralities with high probability will not be possible. In practice, the condition may fail for
networks where links are reserved for strong connections such as close friendships.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we study sequences of stochastic block networks for which each
group’s fraction of the total population remains fixed as n grows, and all link probabilities
pij also remain fixed. It is easy to see these sequences have large enough eigenvalues.
Under these conditions we can characterize eigenvector centrality:
Theorem 1. Suppose A(n) is a sequence of random networks that has non-vanishing spectral
gap and has large enough eigenvalues. Let  > 0. For n sufficiently large, with probability
at least 1 −  the matrix A(n) has a unique largest eigenvalue λ1(n) and the eigenvector
centralities v(A(n)) satisfy
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖2 < .
The theorem says that in large networks, the eigenvector centralities of all agents ap-
proach their expected values, and these expected values can be computed from the prob-
abilities of links. Notably, the distance between an agent’s eigenvector centrality and its
expected value is bounded uniformly (across agents).
The result has the flavor of the law of large numbers, and that theorem gives some
intuition for why the bounds hold. By the law of large numbers, for n big enough most
agents have approximately the expected number of links to each other group. This suggests
their eigenvector centralities will also be close to their expected values, though an actual
proof requires more substantive random graph theory.
The key tool is a result from Chung and Radcliffe (2011) which bounds the norm of the
matrix A(n)− A¯(n) and the difference between the eigenvalues of A(n) and A¯(n). We show
that with large enough eigenvalues, their result implies that for n large, the matrix norm
‖A(n)− A¯(n)‖2 is small and the difference |λ1(n)− λ1(n)| is small compared to λ1(n).
Given these bounds, we can show that A¯(n) and A(n) (considered as linear operators on
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Rn) map the eigenvector centrality v(A(n)) to nearby vectors. In particular, the image of
v(A(n)) under A¯(n) has norm close to λ1(n). Because we bound the spectral gap of A¯ below,
the image of a unit vector under A¯(n) only has norm close to the first eigenvalue when that
vector is close to the first eigenvector v(A¯(n)).
We next state the analogous result for Katz-Bonacich centrality.
Theorem 2. Suppose A(n) is a sequence of random networks that has large enough eigen-
values. Suppose φ(n) is a sequence of constants such that
lim sup
n
φ(n)λ1(n) < 1.
Let  > 0. For n sufficiently large, with probability at least 1− the vectors of Katz-Bonacich
centralities satisfy
‖c(A(n), φ(n))− c(A¯(n), φ(n))‖2 < 
√
n.
The statement is essentially the same as Theorem 1, with eigenvector centrality now
replaced by Katz-Bonacich centrality. So this result says that the Katz-Bonacich centralities
of all in large networks are close to their expected values, and these expected values also
depend only on A¯. Katz-Bonacich centrality has norm O(
√
n) while eigenvector centrality
is defined to have norm 1, so there is an extra factor of
√
n in Theorem 2.
The proof uses the same bounds on the matrix norm ‖A(n)− A¯(n)‖2. The idea is then
to express the relevant Katz-Bonacich centralities as a sum of matrix powers, and to bound
the differences between these matrix powers with the bounds on ‖A(n)− A¯(n)‖2.
Example and Simulations: The simplest non-trivial example is the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph
with A¯(n)ij = p for all i, j, and n. This sequence has non-vanishing spectral gap and large
enough eigenvalues. For any  > 0, Theorem 1 implies
‖v(A(n))− 1√
n
1‖2 < 
with high probability for n large and Theorem 2 implies for suitable φ(n) that
‖c(A(n), φ(n))− 1
1− φ(n)np1‖2 < 
√
n
with high probability for n large.
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We simulated 100 such random networks with p = 1
4
and φ(n) = 1
2λ1(n)
. When n = 500,
the average value of ‖v(A(n))−v(A¯(n))‖2 is 0.0773 and the average value of ‖c(A(n), φ(n))−
c(A¯(n), φ(n))‖2 is 1.757. When n = 1000, the average values are 0.0548 and 1.744, respec-
tively.
Extensions: In Appendix B, we provide several extensions of Theorems 1 and 2. Sub-
section B.1 allows non-integer edge weights by replacing the Bernoulli random variables Aij
with uniform random variables. Subsection B.2 allows for clustering, an increased propensity
for two agents i and j to be connected if both are connected to a common neighbor k, in
this setting with edge weights. We give versions of the two theorems for networks placing
additional weight on triangles along with dyads. Because many real-world social and eco-
nomic networks exhibit more clustering than independent formation of links would imply,
this modification helps accommodate many applications.
Counterexamples: We now give two counterexamples showing that a non-vanishing
spectral gap and large enough eigenvalues are necessary for the two theorems. In the first
example, the eigenvalues of A(n) are well-behaved but the eigenvector centrality depends
discontinuously on the realized network.
Example 1. Suppose that A¯(n)ij =
1
2
if i, j ≤ n
2
or i, j > n
2
and A¯(n)ij = n
−3 otherwise.
The network is divided into two groups, and two agents in the same group are connected with
probability 1
2
while two agents in separate groups are connected with very small probability.
A simple calculation shows that λ2(n)
λ1(n)
→ 1, so that the spectral gap does vanish.
Then with probability converging to 1
2
as n → ∞, the eigenvector centralities of agents
1, 2, . . . , bn
2
c are all 0 while the eigenvector centralities of the remaining agents are positive.
With probability also converging to 1
2
as n → ∞, the eigenvector centralities of agents
bn
2
c+ 1, bn
2
c+ 2, . . . , n are all 0 while the eigenvector centralities of the remaining agents are
positive. On the other hand vi(A¯(n)) =
1√
n
for all i, so
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖2
cannot vanish with high probability. With high probability there are no edges between the
two groups, and when this occurs, the eigenvector centrality can correspond to either of the
two corresponding components of the network. Note that the example does not depend on
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multiplicity of the largest eigenvalue of A¯(n) or A(n), but only on the first two eigenvalues
of these matrices being close.
We observed above that a sequence of random networks has large enough eigenvalues if
(1) the degrees of agents grow sufficiently faster than log n and (2) no small group of agents
has too many links. It is easy to construct counterexamples when all agents’ degrees are
bounded. The next example shows the theorems fail even when degrees grow quickly if links
are too concentrated.
Example 2. Suppose that A¯(n)ij =
1
2
if i = 1 or j = 1 and A¯(n)ij =
logn
n
otherwise.8 The
sequence fails to have large enough eigenvalues: the largest eigenvalue λ1(n) grows at rate
at most
√
2n while the maximum expected degree is ∆ = (n− 1)/2, so
λ1(n)√
∆ log(n)
→ 0.
Let φ(n) = φ0√
2n
for φ0 < 1. By the law of large numbers, with high probability for n
large, agent 1 has degree approximately n/2 while all other agents have degree approximately
log n. Conditional on this event, the number of paths of length k beginning at agent i with
a link to agent 1 is approximately
(n/2)j + o(nj) for k = 2j and (j + 1)(n/2)j log n+ o(nj log n) for k = 2j + 1.
The number of such paths in the weighted network with adjacency matrix A¯(n) is
(n/4)j + o(nj) for k = 2j and (j + 1)(n/4)j log n+ o(nj log n) for k = 2j + 1.
The number of paths beginning at agent i depends substantially on the realization of the
potential link between 1 and i.
A simple computation then shows that we can bound |ci(A(n), φ(n)) − ci(A¯(n), φ(n))|
below by a constant independent of n for all i such that Aij(n) = 1. Thus there exists  > 0
such that for n large
‖c(A(n), φ(n))− c(A¯(n), φ(n))‖2 > 
√
n
with high probability, so Theorem 2 is violated.
8We could also take A¯(n)ij = n
α for α < − 12 .
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Rate of Convergence: While the assumptions we make are not sufficient for our meth-
ods to give guarantees about the rate of convergence of eigenvector and centrality measures,
our analysis can give results about the rate of convergence under stronger assumptions. More
precisely, suppose we have an upper bound on the rate at which
λ1(n)√
∆ log(n)
→∞.
Then one can derive an upper bound on the rate of convergence of the centrality measures
from the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
We make this explicit for Theorem 1. Under the conditions of the theorem, if we let
f(n) =
√
∆ log n/λ1(n), then it follows from our proof that
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖2 < 8(f(n)− f(n)
2)
2δ − δ2 <
8f(n)
δ
with high probability. For example if the degrees of all agents are linear in n, then this gives
an upper-bound of O(
√
logn
n
) for the distance between the eigenvector centralities.
5 Homophily and Inequality
This section elucidates the connections between homophily in network formation and in-
equality of outcomes. To do so requires a network model where we can vary the amount of
homophily, so we consider large stochastic block networks (defined in Section 2).
Our goal is thus to understand which agents are central in stochastic block models. The
first step is applying the main theorems from the previous section, which reduce computing
these centralities to analyzing the matrix of link probabilities A¯. To apply the theorems, we
now carry out this analysis of A¯ for several random network models. We can thus study the
relationship between the parameters governing link formation and distributions of centrality.
We first compare distributions according to Lorenz dominance, which measures relative
inequality. This analysis explains when policy changes affecting network structure will lead
to more equal distributions of outcomes. We then ask which groups benefit most in absolute
terms from changes to the network, i.e. which groups would be most affected by policy
changes.
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5.1 Relative Inequality
We consider a sequence of stochastic block models with m groups and fix all relative group
sizes, so that each group i has size sin for some constants si summing to one and independent
of n.9
Suppose there are just two probabilities of link formation, so the probabilities of link
formation are ps = pii for all i and pd = pij for all i 6= j, where ps > pd.
With two groups, we will assume that s1 > s2 so that group 1 is the majority group. In
the language of the education example from the introduction, the model in this case describes
a school with black and white students. Suppose a majority share s1 of students are white
and that any two students of the same race are friends with probability ps while friendships
between races form with probability pd. We can interpret the results in this section as
describing which schools we should expect to have more equal educational achievement based
on their social networks.
We establish dominance results using the following criterion.
Definition 6. Given two distributions x = (x1, ..., xn) with x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn and y =
(y1, ..., yn) with y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ... ≤ yn, we say that the distribution x Lorenz dominates y if∑k
i=1 xi∑n
i=1 xi
≥
∑k
i=1 yi∑n
i=1 yi
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
In words, distribution x Lorenz dominates distribution y if for each k, the share of total
resources held by the poorest k individuals in distribution x is at least the share held by the
poorest k individuals in distribution y. Geometrically, the definition says that the Lorenz
curve of distribution x (which plots the share of resources held by the poorest k individuals)
lies above the Lorenz curve of distribution y.
Lorenz domination gives a partial order on distributions which nests a wide family of
measures of inequality. Most notably, if distribution x Lorenz dominates distribution y then
x also has a smaller Gini coefficient than y.
9If the sizes sin are not integers, we can round the group sizes by any convention giving total population
size n.
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For the following proposition, let A¯(n) be the matrix of link formation probabilities
with within-group probability ps, between-group probability pd and group sizes s1, . . . , sn.
Similarly let A¯′(n) be the matrix of link formation probabilities with within-group probability
p′s, between-group probability p
′
d and majority group size s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n. In part (i), we compare
distributions of centralities as we vary link formation probabilities fixing group sizes (si = s
′
i).
In part (ii), we vary group sizes while keeping link formation probabilities fixed (ps = p
′
s, pd =
p′d):
Proposition 1. With probability approaching 1 as n→∞:
(i) the eigenvector centralities v(A(n)) Lorenz dominate the eigenvector centralities v(A′(n))
if A′(n) has a higher within-group link formation probability (p′s ≥ ps) and lower between-
group link formation probability (p′d ≤ pd) than A(n).
(ii) with two groups, the eigenvector centralities v(A(n)) Lorenz dominate the eigenvector
centralities v(A′(n)) if A′(n) has a larger majority group (s1 ≤ s′1) and both group sizes
s1, s
′
1 ≤ s for a constant s ∈ (12 , 1) depending on only ps and pd.
Increasing ps and decreasing pd both correspond to increasing homophily. So part (i)
says that more segregated networks lead to more unequal outcomes. Special cases include
fixing one of the parameters ps or pd, as well as varying the two parameters so that the total
number of links stays fixed while the fraction of links within groups increases.
We use the formal connection between eigenvector centrality and the dynamic process of
updating from Section 3.2 to give intuition for this result. Recall that for any non-zero w(0),
Atw(0) is approximately proportional to v(A) for t large. So we can consider repeatedly
updating individuals’ endowments from wi(t− 1) to cwi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni wi(t). With more links
within groups, resources flow to larger groups. With more links between groups, the flows
of resources are more equal.
Part (ii) says that when there are two groups and neither group is too large, a bigger
majority group means more inequality. There are two effects here. The first is that as the
minority group becomes smaller, its members do worse. But the second effect is that as
the minority group grows smaller, there are more individuals in the better off group. When
group sizes are in the range (1
2
, s), the first effect is more important.
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Figure 1: Lorenz curves for eigenvector centralities of two groups with ps = .5, pd = .1,
s1 = .65 in blue, and s
′
1 = .8 in red. Note that neither distribution Lorenz dominates the
other.
When a majority group is much larger than the corresponding minority group, though, we
can obtain two distributions that cannot be compared using Lorenz dominance. The smaller
minority group does worse, but is also smaller, so we cannot determine which distribution
is more unequal (without using an ordering on distributions that is more complete than the
Lorenz). Figure 5 shows an example, with link parameters ps = .5 and pd = .1 and majority
group population shares s = .65 in blue and s = .8 in red.
Using Theorem 1, the proof is reduced to comparing the eigenvector centralities of A¯(n)
and A¯′(n). To do so, we use our recursive definition of eigenvector centrality to compute the
elasticities
∂
∂ps
(
vi(A¯(n))
vi′(A¯(n))
)
= − ∂
∂pd
(
vi(A¯(n))
vi′(A¯(n))
)
=
λ
−1
1 (sl − sl′)n
(1− λ−11 sln(ps − pd))2
,
Here sl and s
′
l are the population shares of the groups containing i and i
′, respectively. This
formula shows that the ratio between the centralities of a member of a larger group and a
member of a smaller group is increasing in ps and decreasing in pd. We show this implies
Lorenz dominance as we decrease ps or increase pd.
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Finally, part (i) of the proposition applies with eigenvector centrality replaced by Katz-
Bonacich centrality. We now fix group sizes.
Proposition 2. Choose a sequence of φ(n) such that
lim sup
n
φ(n)λ1(n) < 1 and lim sup
n
φ(n)λ
′
1(n) < 1.
With probability approaching 1 as n→∞, the Katz-Bonacich centralities c(A(n), φ) Lorenz
dominate the Katz-Bonacich centralities c(A′(n), φ) if A′(n) has a higher within-group link
formation probability (p′s ≥ ps) and lower between-group link formation probability (p′d ≤ pd)
than A(n).
The proof and intuition are similar to Proposition 1. The relevant elasticities are now
∂
∂ps
(
ci(A¯, φ)
cj(A¯, φ)
)
= − ∂
∂pd
(
ci(A¯, φ)
cj(A¯, φ)
)
=
(sl − sl′)(ps − pd)φn
(1− sl(ps − pd)φn)2 ,
where sl and s
′
l are the population shares of the groups containing i and i
′. The basic
intuition about group sizes is also similar, but there are not clean results because the analog
of the cutoff s depends on n and on the choice of constant φ(n).
5.2 Comparisons between Comparative Statics
We now focus on comparative statics of Katz-Bonacich centrality and ask which groups bene-
fit more in absolute terms from changes in link parameters.10 Even with only a within-group
and a between-group link probability, changes in link parameters can have more complicated
effects on levels of centrality. We find that adding within-group links still benefits larger
groups, but adding between-group links can have ambiguous effects. We then give an exam-
ple showing that without the restriction to two link probabilities, extra links between group
1 and group 2 can benefit other well-connected groups more than group 1.
In Appendix C, we provide two formulas for the comparative statics of Katz-Bonacich
centrality as some link probability pij changes. The first expresses the derivative of ci(A, φ)
10Related results have been derived for comparative statics of the first eigenvector, e.g. Magnus (1985)
and Conlisk (1985). Stronger conditions are needed to determine the sign of the derivatives of eigenvector
centrality due to the normalization.
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as a suitably weighted count of the number of walks beginning at agent i. The second is a
more explicit expression depending on the link probabilities pij, and is easy to compute in
examples. This result replace each group with a representative agent and then count walks
in the network of representative agents. These formulas are used to prove the propositions
in this section, and may also be useful tools in other settings.
We again consider stochastic block models with m groups and relative group sizes fixed
at sin.
11 The next two propositions maintain the assumption that there are two link proba-
bilities ps and pd, depending on whether the relevant nodes are in the same group or different
groups.
To facilitate simple statements of results, all comparative statics are first given for de-
terministic networks A¯ with non-integral weights. The corresponding results for sequences
of random networks follow as corollaries.
Let ∂
∂ps
c(A¯, φ) denote the derivative of Katz-Bonacich centrality as the entries of A¯ cor-
responding to within-group links vary.
Proposition 3. Suppose that φ < λ
−1
. Then
∂
∂ps
ci(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂ps
cj(A¯, φ).
whenever i’s group is larger than j’s group.
When more links are added within groups, agents in larger groups benefit more than
agents in smaller groups. Because ci(A¯, φ) is increasing in i’s group size in this setting, this
means that adding connections within groups increases inequality (in absolute terms).
There are two effects contributing to this result. First, increasing ps increases the degree
of agents in larger groups more than the degree of agents in smaller groups. Second, because
agents in larger groups are more central already, these agents are better positioned to benefit
from extra links in other areas of the network. By contrast, when pd changes we will see
these two effects work in opposite directions.
We next consider a sequence of random networks. Let A¯(n) be the matrix of link prob-
abilities arising from these group sizes, within-group link probability ps and between-group
link probability pd. Define A¯
′(n) similarly, with probabilities p′s and p
′
d.
11We again round the group sizes by any convention giving the appropriate total population.
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Corollary 1. Suppose that p′s > ps and p
′
d = pd. Fix a sequence of φ(n) bounded away from
λ1(n) and λ
′
1(n). Then with probability approaching 1 as n→∞,
ci(A
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A(n), φ(n)) > cj(A′(n), φ(n))− cj(A(n), φ(n))
whenever i’s group is larger than j’s group.
Using Theorem 2, we can reduce from random networks to deterministic weighted net-
works. Then the result is a straightforward application of Proposition 3.
When we vary the probability pd of links between groups, results are more ambiguous. Let
∂
∂pd
c(A¯, φ) denote the derivative of Katz-Bonacich centrality as the entries of A¯ corresponding
to between-group links vary.
Proposition 4. There exist constants 0 < φ < φ < λ
−1
such that:
(i) for 0 < φ < φ,
∂
∂pd
ci(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂pd
cj(A¯, φ).
whenever i’s group is smaller than j’s group.
(ii) for φ < φ < λ
−1
,
∂
∂pd
ci(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂pd
cj(A¯, φ).
whenever i’s group is larger than j’s group.
There are now two opposing effects, so extra links between groups can help smaller groups
more or larger groups more. First, increasing pd now increases the degree of those in smaller
groups more than the degree of those in larger groups. But second, agents in larger groups
are still better positioned to take advantage of extra links at a distance.
When φ is small, Katz-Bonacich centrality primarily counts shorter walks. So the first
effect wins out, and smaller effects benefit more. When φ is close enough to λ
−1
1 , Katz-
Bonacich centrality is dominated by walks of very long length. Then the first effect is tiny
while the second effect is large. So agents in a central majority group actually benefit more
from extra connections between groups than those in a disadvantaged minority.
The first result is a straightforward consequence of the relationship between degree cen-
trality and Katz-Bonacich centrality with φ small. When φ is small, Katz-Bonacich centrality
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is approximately equal to an affine transformation of degree centrality, and the comparative
static is easy for degree centrality.
For the second result, the Katz-Bonacich centralities are equal to suitably weighted counts
of the number of walks beginning in each group. We can compute the derivatives of Katz-
Bonacich centrality by adding a very small number of extra links and counting the walks
which pass through these new links (see Appendix C). When φ is large, these counts are
dominated by very long walks, and we claim that for very long walks the starting group
has little effect on which groups the walk passes through. To show the claim formally,
we represent a random walk as a Markov chain with a state corresponding to each agent
and transition probabilities proportional to link probabilities, and then study the stationary
distribution of this Markov chain. Once the claim is shown, we can compute the comparative
statics of interest by counting the total number of walks starting from a given agent, and
this number is higher for members of larger groups.
For the following Corollary, we define A¯(n) and A¯′(n) as in Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose that ps = p
′
s and p
′
d > pd. Fix a sequence of φ(n) bounded away
from λ1(n) and λ
′
1(n). Then there exist constants C,C ∈ (0, 1) such that with probability
approaching 1 as n→∞,
(i) if φ(n) < C · λ1(n)−1 for all n, then
ci(A
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A(n), φ(n)) > cj(A′(n), φ(n))− cj(A(n), φ(n))
whenever i’s group is smaller than j’s group.
(ii) if φ(n) > C · λ1(n)−1 for all n,
ci(A
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A(n), φ(n)) > cj(A′(n), φ(n))− cj(A(n), φ(n))
whenever i’s group is larger than j’s group.
The preceding results rely on the assumption that there are only two link probabilities ps
and pd, depending on whether a pair of agents are in the same group or in separate groups.
With more link probabilities, a wide range of comparative statics are possible. We now give
one interesting example.
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Figure 2: Illustration of a random network with link probabilities as in the proof of Propo-
sition 5.
Let ∂
∂pij
c(A¯, φ) be the derivative of Katz-Bonacich centrality as the entries of A¯ corre-
sponding to links between group i and group j vary.
Proposition 5. There exist a constant φ < λ1, link-formation probabilities A¯ and groups i,
j and k such that
∂
∂pij
ck(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂pij
ci(A¯, φ)
for all φ < φ < λ1.
Adding links between groups i and j increases the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agents
in group k more than those in group i. This is an indication of the power of central net-
work position: group k is so well connected that its members are better positioned to take
advantage of new links than the agents in group i actually forming those links.
To prove the proposition, we give an example with three groups such that connections
within group 1 are very dense, connections between groups 1 and 2 are somewhat sparse,
and all other connections are very sparse (see Figure 2).
Then if extra links are added between groups 2 and 3, group 2 adds more short connections
than group 1. But group 1 adds more longer walks. This is because there are many long
walks that begin in group 1, remain there for many links, and then finish by crossing to
group 2 and then group 3. But most long walks beginning in group 2 and spending most
of their time in group 1 must pass between groups 1 and 2 twice, which is less likely. So
when φ is large, the Katz-Bonacich centrality of a member of group 1 increases more than
the Katz-Bonacich centrality of members of group 2.
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The example extends to actual random networks. We again consider m groups with
relative group sizes fixed, but now allow the entries pij of A¯ to be any constant probabilities.
The entries of A¯′ are equal to the entries of A¯, except for a single pair of groups i and j.
Corollary 3. There exists p′ij > pij, a sequence of constants φ(n) bounded away from λ1(n)
and λ
′
1(n) and groups i, j and k such that with probability approaching 1 as n→∞,
ck(A
′(n), φ(n))− ck(A(n), φ(n)) > ci(A′(n), φ(n))− ci(A(n), φ(n))
for any φ(n) < φ(n) < λ1(n).
6 Other Network Formation Models
The basic technique of the previous section was to compute centralities on random networks
by applying the main theorems and then carrying out a deterministic computation. This
method is more general, and in this section we consider applications to more general random
network models beyond stochastic block models.
The first subsection discusses spatial models of network formation and gives a numerical
example where certain agents are well-positioned when links at a substantial distance are
very unlikely or very likely, but not for intermediate probabilities. The second subsection
gives a model of random networks in which link formation probabilities depend on several
characteristics. Under independence assumptions, the centralities can be computed “char-
acteristic by characteristic”.
6.1 Spatial Models
A common alternative to network formation models based upon group structure relies in-
stead on spatial structure (for a few examples, see Leung (2015), Chaney (2014) and Breza,
Chandrasekhar, McCormick, and Pan (2017)). Agents are distributed in a continuous space
with a distance metric, and closer agents are more likely to be connected. This space could
represent physical locations in a geographic space or more generally some space of charac-
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teristics.12 Our tools can help determine how network centralities in these models depend
on locations and underlying parameters.
In a latent space model based on Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock (2002), the link between
each pair of agents i and j forms with probability A¯ij proportional to
exp(β · xi,j + γd(i, j)),
where xi,j are covariates of the pair, β is a constant vector, γ is a constant coefficient
and d(i, j) is the distance between i and j. When all links form independently, our theo-
rems apply to sequences of such networks. Our theoretical results thus complement Breza,
Chandrasekhar, McCormick, and Pan (2017), who give evidence based on simulations and
empirical data that centralities (as well as other network statistics) can be approximated
well based on only the parameters of latent space models. Our Theorems 1 and 2 imply that
these centralities can indeed be identified asymptotically given the underlying parameters
when agents are spatially distributed such that the conditions of the theorems hold.13
We give a numerical example in a similar model showing that certain agents are central
when links decay at distance very quickly or very slowly, but not when the decay rate is
intermediate. A functional form commonly used in empirical work sets the probability A¯ij
of a link between agents i and j to d(i, j)−ρ. The parameter ρ determines how quickly
connections decay at a distance.
To define A¯, consider agents arranged on an (k + 1)× (k + 1) grid in the plane, so that
there is one agent at each point in
{(x, y) : x, y ∈ Z, 0 ≤ x, y ≤ k}.
Each link between agents at distinct coordinates (x, y) and (x′, y′) has weight d((x, y), (x′, y′))−ρ
where d is Euclidean distance, and each self-link has weight 1. Figure 3 illustrates an example
with k = 20 and ρ = 1
2
.
12Deriving link probabilities from distance imposes a restriction due to the triangle inequality: if i and j
are likely to be linked and j and k are likely to be linked, then the probability of i and k linking is not too
low. This need not hold in stochastic block models.
13For example, if distances d(i, j) are uniformly bounded, there is a uniform positive lower bound on A¯(n)ij
so both conditions hold.
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Figure 3: The Katz-Bonacich centralities of A¯ for a grid with k = 20, ρ = 1
2
and φ · λ1 = 12 .
We consider eigenvector centralities in this network. The following claim is verified in
the appendix:
Claim 1. For ρ ≤ 1, the sequence of random networks A¯(n) has large enough eigenvalues.
Thus, Theorem 2 implies that the centralities on the corresponding random network are
close for k large.
As ρ varies, the rankings between Katz-Bonacich centralities of various agents vary as
well. To give an example, we take k = 20 and set φ = 1
10
· λ−11 . When ρ = 12 , the agent in
position (0, 10) is more central than the agent in position (3, 3). But for ρ sufficiently close to
1, the agent in position (3, 3) is more central than (0, 10). The first agent is on the boundary
in one direction, while the second is near the boundary in both directions and further from
the central agent at (10, 10). When ρ is large, potential neighbors nearby in the grid are
most important and (3, 3) has many of these. As ρ grows small, having many connections
at intermediate distances becomes more valuable. Note that in the limit ρ → 0 all agents
become equally central, so the difference (or ratio) between the centralities is non-monotonic
in ρ.
28
When ρ is very small or large, the agent (3, 3) who is on the interior of a diagonal of
the grid is relatively central. But when ρ is intermediate, that agent suffers due to a small
number of intermediate-length connections and the agent (0, 10) on the center of an edge of
the grid is more central.
6.2 Multicharacteristic Networks
We can build a larger class of network formation models, which we call multicharacteristic
random networks, by combining several characteristics. For example, we could model agents
of different races or genders living in different neighborhoods by combining a stochastic
block model with a model based upon geography. When characteristics are independent,
centralities depend on the two characteristics in a simple, separable manner.
Let A¯(1) and A¯(2) be two matrices of link probabilities for networks of sizes n1 and n2,
respectively. We will let ⊗ denote the Kronecker product. We define multicharacteristic
random networks, which combine the two networks by multiplying link probabilities.
Definition 7. The multicharacteristic random network A¯ = A¯(1)⊗A¯(2) with layers A¯(1)
and A¯(2) has n1n2 agents indexed by (i1, i2) and link probabilities between (i1, i2) and (j1, j2)
given by the product A¯
(1)
i1j1
A¯
(2)
i2j2
of the corresponding link probabilities in the two layers.
If A¯(1) and A¯(2) correspond to two characteristics in the network, then A¯ is the network
formed by assuming the two characteristics are independently distributed and links form
when they would form in both layers independently. These assumptions are strong, but let
us obtain clean expressions for centralities in the multicharacteristic network.
Lemma 1. The eigenvector centrality of agent (i1, i2) in the multicharacteristic random
network A¯ is given by
v(i1,i2)(A¯) = vi1(A¯
(1))vi2(A¯
(2)).
The lemma says that eigenvector centralities can be computed separately in each layer
and multiplied together. Note that we can rephrase the result as stating that
v(A¯) = v(A¯(1))⊗ v(A¯(2)).
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This standard fact can be used to show that centralities behave similarly on actual random
networks.
Proposition 6. Suppose A¯(1)(n1) and A¯
(2)(n2) are sequences of random networks which
both have non-vanishing spectral gaps and large enough eigenvalues. Let A¯(n1n2) be the
corresponding sequence of multicharacteristic random networks. For any  > 0, when n is
sufficiently large
‖v(A(n1n2))− v(A(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2)‖2 < 
with probability at least 1− .
So v(i1,i2)(A) is very likely to be close to vi1(A
(1))vi2(A
(2)) for each agent (i1, i2). When
link probabilities are multiplicative, so are centralities. The proof applies Theorem 1 and
Lemma 1.
The results extend immediately to networks with more than two characteristics.
7 Conclusion
We gave asymptotic characterizations of the eigenvector and Katz-Bonacich centralities of
agents in random networks. Theoretically, these results simplify questions about how chang-
ing network structure affects who is central. We provided several applications: (1) In stochas-
tic block models, we showed the interaction between network segregation and differences in
group sizes increases inequality. (2) We could calculate and compare the network centralities
of agents in various locations when links depend on spatial locations. (3) When networks
depend on several independent characteristics, centralities could be computed by treating
each characteristic separately.
We conclude by proposing several consequences of our techniques beyond these applica-
tions:
• Centrality can be studied in applied settings where full network data is unavailable: in
large networks we can approximate agents’ centralities well using only link formation
probabilities for various groups.
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• Conversely, when an econometrician has access to network data but parameters in the
underlying network formation process are unobserved, our theorems justify a struc-
tural model of network formation. The unobserved parameters can be estimated using
centralities or related quantities as moments.
• A large literature in industrial organization models pricing decisions as a quadratic
game, with each firm competing with their neighbors in a network (Vives (2010), Vives
(2017)). While this literature has focused on simple network structures, our methods
could be used to solve for expected prices on random networks and study how network
structure influences prices.
Like the applications developed in the present work, each relies on the basic method of
reducing questions about random graphs to deterministic calculations.
A Proofs
We will sometimes refer to the Euclidean norm and the induced matrix norm as ‖·‖, omitting
the subscripts 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. The outline of the proof is as follows: the first step is to show that the
matrix norm ‖A(n) − A¯(n)‖2 is small with high probability. To show that this implies the
corresponding eigenvector centralities are close, we observe that v(A(n)) is the vector in the
unit sphere with the largest image under the linear operator A(n). When the spectral gap
is not too small, any other vector in the unit sphere with image almost as large under A(n)
must be close to v(A(n)). When ‖A(n)− A¯(n)‖2 is small we can show that the eigenvector
centrality of A¯(n) has large image under A(n), and so must be close to the eigenvector
centrality of A(n).14
Let  > 0. Recall we defined ∆ = maxi
∑n
j=1 A¯(n)ij to be the maximum expected degree
of a node. We sometimes drop arguments n in the remainder of the proof, so for example
A(n) will be referred to as A.
14An alternate approach to the eigenvector perturbation theory argument, which we produce directly here,
is to appeal to the Davis-Kahan theorem (as in Avella-Medina, Parise, Schaub, and Segarra (2017).)
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It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 of Chung and Radcliffe (2011) that with probability
at least 1− 
|λ1 − λ1| ≤
√
4∆ log(2n/). (2)
In fact it follows from the proof of the theorem cited that with probability at least 1− 
‖A− A¯‖ ≤
√
4∆ log(2n/). (3)
Note that the theorem cited uses our assumption that A is symmetric. We will show that
when these inequalities hold,
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖2 < .
Because the sequence has large enough eigenvalues,
√
4∆ log(2n/) ≤ f(n)λ1 (4)
for some sequence f(n)→ 0. So we have
‖A¯v(A)‖ ≥ ‖Av(A)‖ − ‖A− A¯‖‖v(A)‖ by the triangle inequality
≥ λ1 − f(n)λ1 by equations 3 and 4
= λ1 − (λ1 − λ1)− f(n)λ1
≥ λ1(1− 2f(n)) by equation 2.
On the other hand, we can write v(A) = α1v(A¯) + α2w, where w is a unit vector
orthogonal to v(A¯) and α21 +α
2
2 = 1 (where the coefficients α1 and α2 vary with n). Because
the orthogonal complement to v(A¯) is the span of the other eigenvectors of A¯, we have
‖A¯w‖ ≤ λ2.
Because the sequence has non-vanishing spectral gap, there exists δ > 0 such that |λ2| <
(1− δ)λ1. So
‖A¯v(A)‖ ≤
√
(α1λ1)2 + (α2λ2)2
≤ λ1
√
α21 + (1− δ)2α22.
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Combining the upper and lower bound on ‖A¯v(A)‖, we conclude that√
α21 + (1− δ)2α22 ≥ (1− 2f(n)).
Because f(n) → 0 and α21 + α22 = 1, this implies that α2 → 0 as n → 0. So taking n
sufficiently large, we conclude that
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖ < 
with probability at least 1− .
Proof of Theorem 2. The outline of the proof is as follows: we show as in the proof of
Theorem 1 that the matrix norm ‖A(n) − A¯(n)‖2 is small with high probability. We then
expand c(A(n), φ(n)) as a sum of powers of the adjacency matrix. Using the bound on
‖A(n)− A¯(n)‖2, we show these powers are also close in the matrix norm.
We have
c(A¯(n), φ(n)) =
∞∑
k=0
φ(n)kA¯(n)k1n,
and the analogous formula for A(n).
Because lim supn φ(n)λ1(n) < 1, there exists K and N such that∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=K
φ(n)kA¯(n)k
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∞∑
k=K
(φ(n)λ1(n))
k < 
whenever n ≥ N . Increasing N and decreasing  if necessary, we can assume (by equations 3
and 4 from the proof of Theorem 1) that
‖φ(n)(A¯(n)− A(n))‖ < /(K2),∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=K
φ(n)kA¯(n)k
∥∥∥∥∥ <  and
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=K
φ(n)kA(n)k
∥∥∥∥∥ < 
with probability at least 1−  whenever n ≥ N . We condition on this event.
We have taken N sufficiently large so that ‖φ(n)A¯(n)‖ < 1, and (taking  smaller if
necessary) it follows from the bound on ‖φ(n)(A¯(n)−A(n))‖ that ‖φ(n)A(n)‖ ≤ 1. Dropping
the argument n,
‖φk+1Ak+1 − φk+1A¯k+1‖ = ‖φ(A− A¯)(φkAk) + φA¯(φkAk − φkA¯k)‖
≤ ‖φ(A− A¯)‖‖φkAk‖+ ‖φA¯‖‖φkAk − φkA¯k‖,
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where the second line is by the triangle inequality and submultiplicativity of the matrix
norm. Thus, the left-hand side increases by at most /K2 each time we increase k by one.
So by induction on k, the left-hand side is less than /K for all k < K.
Then
‖c(A(n), φ(n))− c(A¯(n), φ(n))‖ ≤
∞∑
k=0
φ(n)k‖A(n)k − A¯(n)k‖‖1n‖
=
K−1∑
k=0
φ(n)k‖A(n)k − A¯(n)k‖‖1n‖
+
∞∑
k=K
φ(n)k‖A(n)k − A¯(n)k‖‖1n‖.
The first term is less than ‖1n‖ because each summand is less than /K. The second term
is less than 2‖1n‖ by the bounds on
∥∥∑∞
k=K φ(n)
kA¯(n)k
∥∥ and ∥∥∑∞k=K φ(n)kA(n)k∥∥. So the
difference of Katz-Bonacich centralities is less than 3‖1n‖ = 3
√
n.
Lemma 2. Suppose A(n) is a sequence of random networks generated from a stochastic block
model (with m groups and fixed positive link probabilities) with non-vanishing spectral gap.
Let  > 0. For n sufficiently large, with probability at least 1−  we have
vi(A(n))
vi(A¯(n))
∈ [1− , 1 + ] and ci(A(n))
ci(A¯(n))
∈ [1− , 1 + ]
for all i.
Proof. We first consider eigenvector centrality. Because the link probabilities do not depend
on the size of the matrix, the eigenvalue λ1 and the maximum expected degree ∆ are O(n),
so the sequence has large enough eigenvalues. By Theorem 1,
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖2 < 
with probability 1− /2 for each n sufficiently large.
By a standard bound on the ratio between the norms ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖2, we have
‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖1 < 
√
n.
For each i,
vi(A(n)) = λ
−1
1
∑
j∈Ni
vj(A(n))
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and
vi(A¯(n)) = λ
−1
1
∑
j
A¯(n)ijvj(A¯(n)).
Applying the bound on ‖v(A(n))− v(A¯(n))‖1,
|vi(A(n))− λ−11
∑
j∈Ni
vj(A¯(n))| = |λ−11
∑
j∈Ni
vj(A(n))− λ−11
∑
j∈Ni
vj(A¯(n))| < λ−11 
√
n.
Now, we will use Chebyshev’s theorem to bound the number of connections to each
group uniformly in i. We consider the event Eik that the number
∑
j∈Ni, group k A(n)ij of
agents in a given group k who are neighbors of i is within a factor of  of its expected
value
∑
j in group k A¯(n)ij. By Chebyshev’s theorem, the probability of the complement of Eik
vanishes at an exponential rate. Thus, for n sufficiently large we can assume that Eik holds
for all i and k with probability at least 1− /2.
When this event Eik occurs, we have
|
∑
j∈Ni
vj(A¯(n))−
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))| < C
√
n
for some constant C ≥ √nmaxj A¯ijvj(A¯(n)) independent of n.
Thus for n large, with probability at least 1− , we have
|vi(A(n))− λ−11
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))| < λ−11 (
√
n+ C
√
n)
Combining this with the bound on |λ1 − λ1| from the proof of Theorem 1, we have
|vi(A(n))− vi(A¯(n))| ≤ |vi(A(n))− λ−11
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))|+ |λ−11
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))− λ−11
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))|
= |vi(A(n))− λ−11
∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))|+ |λ1 − λ1| · λ−11 · |λ1
−1∑
j
A¯ijvj(A¯(n))|
= λ−11 (
√
n+ C
√
n) + vi(A¯(n)).
Because λ−11 grows at a linear rate while vi(A¯(n)) is O(n
−1/2), the desired bound follows.
The proof for Katz-Bonacich centrality follows by the same argument, up to the difference
in normalizations. We now use the expressions
ci(A(n), φ(n)) = 1 + φ(n)
∑
j∈Ni
cj(A(n), φ(n))
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Figure 4: Lorenz curves for eigenvector centralities of two groups with ps = .5, pd = .05,
s1 = .75 in blue, and p
′
s = .4, p
′
d = .1, s
′
1 = .75 in red. The red distribution Lorenz dominates
the blue distribution.
and
ci(A¯(n), φ(n)) = 1 + φ(n)
∑
j
A¯(n)ijcj(A¯(n), φ(n))
from Definition 2 instead of the recursive expressions of eigenvector centrality.
Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 2 tells us that for a sequence of random matrices generated
as in the proposition statement with population size Ni, each of the entries of the first
eigenvector of each matrix A is close to the corresponding entry of the first eigenvector of A¯
with probability close to one.
We first show (i). By definition, the eigenvector centralities satisfy
vi(A¯(n)) = λ
−1
1 (sln(ps − pd)vi(A¯(n)) + pd
n∑
j=1
vj(A¯(n))),
where sl is the size of the group containing i. For any i
′ in a group of size sl′ , we have
vi(A¯(n))
vi′(A¯(n))
=
1− λ−11 sl′n(ps − pd)
1− λ−11 sln(ps − pd)
.
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Thus,
∂
∂ps
(
vi(A¯(n))
vi′(A¯(n))
)
= − ∂
∂pd
(
vi(A¯(n))
vi′(A¯(n))
)
=
λ
−1
1 (sl − sl′)n
(1− λ−11 sln(ps − pd))2
.
The right-hand side is positive if and only if sl > sl′ .
Now, we can order the agents 1, . . . , n so that their group sizes are increasing. Increasing
ps and decreasing pd will increase
vi(A¯(n))
vi′ (A¯(n))
for any i > i′. Thus, this change will decrease
∑k
i=1 vi(A¯(n))∑n
i=1 vi(A¯(n))
=
 n∑
i=1
1∑k
i′=1
vi′ (A¯(n))
vi(A¯(n))
−1 .
for each 1 ≤ k < n. This proves the Lorenz dominance result.
To prove (ii), we compute the eigenvector centrality when there are two groups from the
first eigenvector of the 2-by-2 matrixs1Nps (1− s1)Npd
s1Npd (1− s1)Nps
 ,
which replaces each group with a representative agent.
The first eigenvector of s1Nps (1− s1)Npd
s1Npd (1− s1)Nps

is equal to  1
(1−2s1)ps+
√
(1−2s1)2p2s+4s1(1−s1)p2d
(2−2s1)pd
 ,
up to rescaling.
So the first eigenvector of A¯ has first s1N entries equal to 1 and final (1 − s1)N entries
equal to
(1− 2s1)ps +
√
(1− 2s1)2p2s + 4s1(1− s1)p2d
(2− 2s1)pd ,
up to rescaling.
Let
T (s) = sN +
(1− 2s1)ps +
√
(1− 2s1)2p2s + 4s1(1− s1)p2d
2pd
·N
be the total of the entries of the first eigenvector.
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Figure 5: Lorenz curves for Katz-Bonacich centralities of two groups with 100 agents and
parameter values ps = .5, pd = .05, s1 = .75, φ = .02 in blue, and p
′
s = .4, p
′
d = .1, s
′
1 = .75,
φ = .02 in red. The red distribution Lorenz dominates the blue distribution.
Differentiating this shows that ∂T
∂s
is non-negative if and only if
s1 ≤ 1
2
+
pd
2
√
2p2d + 2pspd
.
We conclude that the first eigenvector corresponding to (s, ps, pd) Lorenz dominates the
first eigenvector corresponding to (s′1, ps, pd) if
s′1 ≤
1
2
+
pd
2
√
2p2d + 2pspd
and s1 ≤ s′1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows the same argument as the proof of Proposition 1.
Definition 2 now gives
ci(A¯, φ)
ci′(A¯, φ)
=
1− sl′(ps − pd)φn
1− sl(ps − pd)φn .
Thus, we compute the elasticities
∂
∂ps
(
ci(A¯, φ)
cj(A¯, φ)
)
= − ∂
∂pd
(
ci(A¯, φ)
cj(A¯, φ)
)
=
(sl − sl′)(ps − pd)φn
(1− sl(ps − pd)φn)2 .
38
Just as for eigenvector centrality, this has the same sign as sl − s′l. The remainder of the
proof is the same.
Proof of Proposition 3. We want to show that
∂
∂ps
ci(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂ps
ci′(A¯, φ)
when i is in a larger group than i′. By Lemma 3, we have
∂
∂ps
ci(A¯, φ) =
1
ps
∞∑
k=0
φk
∑
γk beginning at i
f(γk)
k−1∏
j=0
pijij+1 ,
where the inner sum is over walks of length k beginning at agent i and f(γk) is the number
of edges of γk from a group to itself.
We claim that ∑
γk beginning at i
f(γk)
k−1∏
j=0
pijij+1 >
∑
γk beginning at i′
f(γk)
k−1∏
j=0
pijij+1
for each k.
For length 1 walks, note that the number of walks from i to an agent in another group is
independent of i’s group, and each of these walks has f(γ1) = 0. The number of walks from
i to an agent in the same group is increasing in the size of i’s group, and each of these walks
has f(γ1) = 1. So we can choose an injection φ1 from the set of length 1 walks beginning at
i′ to the set of length 1 walks beginning at i preserving f(γ1) and edge weights and sending
each walk γ1 to a walk φ1(γ
1) such that the group φ1(γ
1) ends in is at least as large as the
group that γ1 ends in.
Given a map φk−1 satisfying these properties, we can construct φk satisfying the same
properties. We send γk to a walk defined by using φk−1 to determine the first k agents and
then defining the last agent as in the previous paragraph. This proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 3,
ci(A¯
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A¯(n), φ(n)) > cj(A¯′(n), φ(n))− cj(A¯(n), φ(n))
for all n. We must check that Theorem 2 applies.
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The sequence has large enough eigenvalues because λ1(n) is O(n) and ∆ is linear in n.
The non-zero eigenvalues of A¯(n) are proportional to the eigenvalues of the matrix
s1ps s1pd . . . s1pd
s2pd s2ps . . . s2pd
...
...
. . .
...
smpd smpd . . . smps
 ,
where s1, s2, ..., sm are the population shares in each group. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem
the first and second eigenvalues of this matrix are distinct, so the sequence has non-vanishing
spectral gap.
Choose  small enough so that
ci(A¯
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A¯(n), φ(n))− 2 > cj(A¯′(n), φ(n))− cj(A¯(n), φ(n)) + 2.
With probability approaching 1 as n→∞,
ci(A¯
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A′(n), φ(n)) < 
and similarly for the other three centrality terms. So the desired inequality holds with
probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let di(A¯) denote the degree of agent i. As φ → 0, the Katz-
Bonacich centrality
ci(A¯, φ) = 1 + φdi(A¯) +O(φ
2)
is equal to positive affine transformation of the degree centrality of φ, plus terms of order
φ2. As pd increases, the change in degree
∂
∂pd
di(A¯) is equal to the total number of agents n
minus the size of agent i’s group. In particular, this derivative is decreasing in the group
size.
(ii) Suppose i’s group is larger than j’s group.
By Lemma 3, the derivative of the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i is
∂
∂pd
ci(A¯, φ) =
1
pd
∞∑
k=0
φk
∑
γk beginning at i
f(γk)
k−1∏
l=0
pilil+1 (5)
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where the sum is over walks γk of length k starting at agent i, the indices i0, i1, ..., ik are the
groups that the walks pass through, and f(γk) is the number of times γk switches groups.
Consider the Markov chain with states corresponding to the groups in our network and
transition probabilities from state s′ to state s′′ given by ps′s′′/
∑m
s=1 ps′s. The probability
that the Markov chain is in state s at time k given an initial state is equal to the probability
that a random walk beginning in the group corresponding to the initial state of length k
ends at s, where each walk is chosen with probability proportional to
∏k−1
l=0 pilil+1 .
The Markov chain converges to a stationary distribution. Therefore as k → ∞, the
expected number of times the Markov chain has switched states by time k approaches ck for
some constant c independent of the initial state. So as k grows large,
∑
γk:i in group i0
f(γk)
k−1∏
l=0
pilil+1 → c
∑
γk:i in group i0
k−1∏
l=0
pilil+1 .
Because i’s group is larger than j’s group,∑
γk:i in group i0
∏k−1
l=0 pilil+1∑
γk:j in group i0
∏k−1
l=0 pilil+1
is then bounded below by a constant greater than 1.
As φ approaches λ
−1
, the ratio on the right-hand side of equation 5 diverges to ∞.
Moreover, we showed in the previous paragraph that∑
γk:i in group i0
f(γk)
∏k−1
l=0 pilil+1∑
γk:j in group i0
f(γk)
∏k−1
l=0 pilil+1
is bounded below by a constant greater than 1 for all but finitely many k. This implies that
for all but finitely many values of k, the terms in equation 5 corresponding to length k paths
are at least this constant times the same terms when the starting agent i is replaced by j.
So summing over k, we can conclude that
∂
∂pd
ci(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂pd
cj(A¯, φ)
for φ large enough.
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Proof of Corollary 2. Fix some n0. By Proposition 4, there exists φ such that
ci(A
′(n0), φ(n0))− ci(A(n0), φ(n0)) > cj(A′(n0), φ(n0))− cj(A(n0), φ(n0))
whenever 0 < φ < φ and i’s group is larger than j’s group.
The Katz-Bonacich centralities of A¯(n0) are a positive affine transformation of the Katz-
Bonacich centralities of the matrix
s1ps s1pd . . . s1pd
s2pd s2ps . . . s2pd
...
...
. . .
...
smpd smpd . . . smps
 ,
where si are the population shares of each group. This is because the centralities are pro-
portional except the constant term corresponding to length zero walks. The same statement
holds for A¯′(n0) with the same rescaling.
The upshot is that the inequality comparing centralities does not depend on the choice
of n0. So it follows that for any n such that φ(n)/λ1(n) < φ/λ1(n0), we have
ci(A
′(n), φ(n))− ci(A(n), φ(n)) > cj(A′(n), φ(n))− cj(A(n), φ(n)).
The remainder of the proof of part (i) proceeds as in the proof of Corollary 1, and the
analogous argument shows part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose we have three groups of equal size K = n/3 such that
p11 = 1, p12 = p21 = δ, and all other link probabilities are 0. We will show that for φ
sufficiently large and δ sufficiently small,
∂
∂p23
c1(A¯, φ) >
∂
∂p23
cn/3+1(A¯, φ).
Note that agent 1 is in group 1 while agent n/3 + 1 is in group 2.
To check this identity, note that
(I − φP )−1 ≈

1
1−φK
φKδ
1−φK 0
φKδ
1−φK 1 0
0 0 1
 ,
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where P is the 3 × 3 matrix with entries Pij = Kpij equal to the number of links from a
given agent in group i to any agent in group j. The approximation is dropping terms of
order δ2. The entries (I − φA)−1kl are equal to the entries (I − φP )−1ij corresponding to the
groups of k and l.
Using Lemma 4, we compute
∂
∂p23
c1(A¯, φ) ≈ φ
2K2δ
1− φK and
∂
∂p23
cn/3+1(A¯, φ) ≈ φK.
Fixing δ sufficiently small and taking φ→ 1/K (keeping φ feasible), we find the first expres-
sion is larger than the second for all φ sufficiently large.
Proof of Corollary 3. By Proposition 5, we can choose A¯ and A¯′ with n0 agents each such
that pij is larger in A¯
′ than A¯ and other link probabilities agree, groups i, j and k and a
constant φ < λ1 such that
ck(A¯
′, φ)− ck(A¯, φ) > ci(A¯′, φ)− ci(A¯, φ)
whenever φ < φ < λ1.
Define sequences of stochastic block networks by letting all relative group sizes and link
formation-probabilities be the same as in A¯ and A¯′, respectively. Let φ(n) = n
n0
φ for each n.
Then arguing as in the proof of Corollary 2, we find that
ck(A¯
′(n), φ(n))− ck(A¯(n), φ(n)) > ci(A¯′(n), φ(n))− ci(A¯(n), φ(n))
for each n.
The proof concludes with the same arguments as the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Claim 1. By equation (1), we must check that
(min
i,j
A¯(n)ij)
∑
i
∑
j
A¯(n)ij ≥ ∆ log n,
where n = (k + 1)2.
We first note that
∆ = max
i
∑
j
A¯(n)ij ≤ 4 min
i
∑
j
A¯(n)ij.
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This is because the maximum is obtained at the node(s) at the center of the grid while the
minimum is obtained by the corner nodes. Dividing the grid into four quadrants vertically
and horizontally, the expected number of links from a corner node to the nearest quadrant
is equal to the expected number number of links from a center node to any quadrant.
Since mini,j A¯(n)ij ≥ (
√
2k)−ρ, we conclude that
min
i,j
A¯(n)ij
∑
i
∑
j
A¯(n)ij ≥ (
√
2k)−ρ · (4∆n).
The right-hand side grows faster than ∆ log n.
Proof of Lemma 1. See for example Theorem 13.12 of Laub (2005).
Proof of Proposition 6. By Theorem 1, we have
‖v(A(i)(ni))− v(A¯(i)(ni))‖2 < /2
for ni sufficiently large and i = 1, 2. By the triangle inequality
‖v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A¯(2)(n2))− v(A(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))‖2
is less than or equal to
‖v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))− v(A(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))‖2+
‖v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A¯(2)(n2))− v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))‖2.
Because v is normalized to have Euclidean norm one, each of these two terms is less than
/2.
Because λ1,∆ and log(n) are all multiplicative in the Kronecker product, A¯(n1n2) has
non-vanishing spectral gap and large enough eigenvalues. So by Theorem 1,
‖v(A(n1n2))− v(A¯(n1n2))‖2 < 
for n1n2 sufficiently large.
So we have
‖v(A(n1n2))− v(A(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))‖2 ≤ ‖v(A¯(n1n2))− v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A¯(2)(n2))‖2
+ ‖v(A¯(1)(n1))⊗ v(A¯(2)(n2))− v(A(1)(n1))⊗ v(A(2)(n2))‖2
+ ‖v(A¯(n1n2))− v(A(n1n2))‖2.
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The first term is zero by Lemma 1. The second and third term are each at most  by the
preceding paragraphs.
B Extensions
B.1 Weighted Edges
In this subsection, we relax the assumption that Aij ∈ {0, 1} to allow non-integral edge
weights Aij ≥ 0. The centrality measures v(A) and c(A) are defined as before.
Suppose that for each pair of groups i and j, the edge weights between agents in group
i and group j are independent uniform random variables on some interval [lij(n), uij(n)].
Then Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold as before with A¯(n) = E[A(n)].
Proof. First note that we can approximate uniform random variables on some non-negative
interval [l, u] by linear combinations of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with positive coef-
ficients. We discuss the case l = 0 and u = 1, and the argument extends easily.
Consider the weighted sum with coefficients 2−k for k = 1, ...,m of i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables equal to 1 with probability 1
2
. As m→∞, this sum converges in probability to the
uniform random variable on [0, 1].
In the proof of Theorem 1 of Chung and Radcliffe (2011), the authors express A as a
sum of independent random matrices Xij, where Xij is the product of a Bernoulli random
variable equal to one with probability pij and the matrix with entries (i, j) and (j, i) equal
to one and all other entries zero. We instead express A as a sum of independent variables
Xij,k corresponding to the terms in the sum in the previous paragraph. Because all relevant
quantities are continuous and our previous arguments do not depend on the number of
random variables, our proof proceeds as before when we take m sufficiently large.
B.2 Clustering
When edges have non-integral weights as in Appendix B.1, it is straightforward to allow
clustering in the network. We present a variation of our model in which weights between i
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and j are likely to be higher when both agents are connected to some other agent k. This
tendency is produced by allowing triangles to form in addition to pairwise connections.
As before, for each pair of agents k in group i and l in group j we draw an independent
Bernoulli random variable equal to one with probability pij. In addition, for each triplet of
agents k, k′ and k′′ in groups i, i′ and i′′ we draw an independent Bernoulli random variable
equal to one with probability pii′i′′ . The entry Aij is equal to the sum of these random
variables over the pair i, j and all triplets including i and j.
So if the direct link between i and j does not form, Aij is equal to the number of triplets
containing i and j which form. If the direct link between i and j does form, Aij is equal to
one plus the number of triplets containing i and j which form.
Then Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 still hold with A¯(n) = E[A(n)]. The proof is a straight-
forward modification of the proof in Section B.1.
Alternately, we can allow the weights on each link and each triplet to be uniform random
variables. Suppose for each pair of agents k in group i and l in group j we draw a uniform
random variable on [lij(n), uij(n)]. In addition, for each triplet of agents k, k
′ and k′′ in
groups i, i′ and i′′ we draw a uniform random variable on [lii′i′′(n), uii′i′′(n)]. If entry Aij is
again equal to the sum of these random variables over the pair i, j and all triplets including
i and j, then Theorems 1 and 2 continue to hold.
Finally, the discussion above includes only direct links and triangles. The results extend
similarly to allow other subgraphs, such as cliques with more than three agents.
C Comparative Statics of Katz-Bonacich Centrality
We give two formulas for the derivatives of Katz-Bonacich centrality in stochastic block
models. Our first formula expresses the derivative of cl(A, φ) as a weighted count of the
number of walks starting at agent l. Let γk denote a walk of length k, let i0, i1, ..., ik be the
groups the walk passes through, and let f(γk) be the number of times γk passes between
groups i and i′.
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Lemma 3. The derivative of the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent l is
∂
∂pii′
cl(A, φ) =
1
pii′
∞∑
k=0
φk
∑
γk beginning at l
f(γk)
k−1∏
j=0
pijij+1 .
This is equal to the number of walks with each counted with multiplicity given by the proba-
bility of the walk forming times the number of times the walk passes between groups i and i′,
each discounted by the walk length.
Proof of Lemma 3. We have
cl(A, φ) =
∞∑
k=0
φk
∑
γk beginning at l
(
k−1∏
j=0
pijij+1
)
.
The result follows from computing the derivative.
Our second formula expresses the derivative of ck(A, φ) explicitly in terms of the link
probabilities pij. Denote the number of agents in each group i by sin. Let P , which can be
thought of as the adjacency matrix of the network with each group replaced by a represen-
tative agent, be the m×m matrix with entries Pij = sjnpij.
Lemma 4. The derivative of the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent k in group l in terms of
pij is
∂
∂pij
ck(A, φ) = φn
(
m∑
l′=1
sj(I − φP )−1li (I − φP )−1jl′ + si(I − φP )−1lj (I − φP )−1il′
)
.
Proof of Lemma 4. We have
∂
∂pij
ck(A, φ) =
∞∑
t=0
∂(φtAt1)k
∂pij
=
∞∑
t=0
∞∑
t′=0
((φA)t
∂(φA)
∂pij
(φA)t
′
1)k.
For any l and l′, (I − φP )ll′ is equal to the discounted number of walks which begin
at some fixed agent in group l and end at any agent in group l′. On the other hand, the
entries of
∑∞
t=0(φA)
t correspond to the discounted numbers of walks which begin at some
fixed agent in group l and end at some fixed agent in group l′.
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The derivative ∂(φA)
∂pij
of A as we vary the link probability between groups i and j has
entries equal to φ when one index corresponds to an agent in group i and the other to an
agent in group j and all other entries zero. So we compute that the double summation above
is equal to
φn
(
m∑
l′=1
sj(I − φP )−1li (I − φP )−1jl′ + si(I − φP )−1lj (I − φP )−1il′
)
,
as desired. The two terms correspond to walks passing through an edge from group i to
group j and walks passing in the opposite direction.
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